Moderated by CIENS postdoctoral researcher Louise Matz, the roundtable discussion held on Friday, June 19, as part of the symposium organized by the Institute for Geopolitical Studies of Advanced Research—founded by Le Grand Continent in partnership with the ENS—sought to answer the following question: “Is geopolitics also used to wage war?” echoing Yves Lacoste’s 1976 book.

Alongside sociologists and historians—including Professor Julian Jackson (Queen Mary University of London), author of the award-winning biography of Charles de Gaulle that inspired the two-part film *La Bataille de Gaulle*, currently in theaters—Frédéric Gloriant, director of CIENS, spoke about France’s nuclear history.

At the heart of his presentation, he argued that this trajectory was largely shaped in response to the trauma of 1940. He proposed examining several dimensions:

• the determination, from the very beginning, of French scientists to assert their independence from the United States and to oppose an American monopoly on nuclear science;

• the nuclear bomb viewed as a means of erasing the defeat of 1940.

“By giving France a reassuring margin of strategic superiority over Germany, independent of its relations with its Anglo-Saxon allies, the French bomb helped exorcise the anti-German fears inherited from a century of Franco-German rivalry,” he stated.

He continued: “I would even go further: paradoxicallyHe continued: “I would even go further: paradoxically, the French bomb served as a powerful catalyst for Franco-German reconciliation. Possession of the bomb allowed France to no longer depend on the British or the Americans to ensure its security vis-à-vis Germany. This decisive development made possible a direct and trusting strategic dialogue between France and West Germany. ”

• And finally, the gradual emergence, during the second half of the 20th century, of a deep and widespread commitment—on both the left and the right—to possessing nuclear weapons as the material foundation of restored national sovereignty, which is exceptional in Western Europe and contributes to a configuration of the nuclear debate specific to France.

“In Cold War democracies, if you were on the far left, you tended to criticize the United States and NATO, and thus adopt an anti-nuclear stance, as was the case in Germany, for example. Anti-nuclear sentiment and criticism of the United States very often go hand in hand. In France, however, anti-Americanism has paradoxically fueled a pro-nuclear stance, contrary to the dominant Western pattern,” he emphasized.